

Income-based environmental responsibility

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Abstract

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are an environmental pressure that currently raise serious concerns and that are subject to strong mitigation efforts. An allocation of the mitigation effort among multiple agents requires the prior allocation of emissions among those same agents by a metric of carbon responsibility. The metric adopted by current climate policy is production-based (or territorial) responsibility. However, other types of responsibility have been discussed in the literature, namely consumption-based (or upstream) responsibility and downstream responsibility. In this paper we study the latter type, which is little explored in the literature, with the aim of bringing it to the climate policy discussion. We clarify the term through a novel nomenclature, *income-based responsibility* and present a case-study, with the quantification of income-based responsibility for 112 world regions,

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we compare the results with production and consumption-based responsibilities.

Keywords: carbon responsibility, downstream responsibility, income responsibility, multi-regional input-output analysis

1. Introduction

In the economic process primary factors of production, such as natural resources, labor and capital, are transformed into consumption goods and services, generating adverse environmental pressures. There is a widespread perception that the current levels of consumption and the consequent exploitation of natural resources are unsustainable, leading to environmental problems, such as the alteration of current climate patterns, scarcity of drinking water or scarcity of arable land. In order to control and minimize the externalities that result from the economic process it is necessary to quantify environmental pressures and to allocate responsibility for them to the economic agents involved.

Climate change is currently a priority area of environmental policy (UNEP, 2007; OECD, 2008; EEA, 2010), with a lot of attention focused on anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Many scientists believe that in order to reduce these risks a substantial reduction of GHG emissions is needed (mitigation).

The global nature of climate change requires global action; for example, if one large emitter does not commit to its responsibility and mitigation target, it is unlikely that the rest of the world can compensate for it. Moreover any emitter that stays out of any agreement will benefit from the action taken

21 by others; mitigation efforts to cope with climate change can be considered
22 public goods which allow for free-riding phenomena (Stern, 2007), potentially
23 impairing or delaying climate policy. The extent of global participation is
24 essential because the higher the participation rate in any action taken, the
25 least costly it will be (OECD, 2003).

26 Since 1992, in the Earth Summit, international negotiations are in place
27 seeking a global agreement for the attribution of GHG emissions' responsi-
28 bility and reduction. But only in 1997 significant results were achieved, with
29 the Kyoto Protocol. Under the Protocol each country should report, through
30 a national GHG inventory, the 'emissions and removals taking place within
31 national (including administered) territories and offshore areas over which
32 the country has jurisdiction'. For the countries who ratified it, a binding
33 target of reduction of GHG emissions was also established: 5% (on average),
34 during the 2008-2012 period against 1990 levels (UNFCCC, 1998).

35 Under the Kyoto Protocol, a country should hold responsibility for all the
36 emissions that are directly generated by the production processes that take
37 place within its borders. This type of responsibility is often called *producer-*
38 *based responsibility*, and accounts for the *direct emissions* of a country.

39 The geographic boundary established for GHG inventories, also used in
40 other environmental statistics, leaves the emissions generated by interna-
41 tional activities unaccounted for, does not consider the transfer of emis-
42 sions through international trade, and enables carbon leakage (Pedersen and
43 de Haan, 2006; Peters and Hertwich, 2008a; Peters et al., 2011)

44 The limitations of this approach became evident when big emitters, like
45 the USA and China, refused to ratify the Protocol or to commit to binding

46 targets. Underlying these decisions were issues of fairness and fear of im-
47 paired competitiveness among countries (Peters and Hertwich, 2008b; Whal-
48 ley and Walsh, 2009). Developing economies that are highly dependent on
49 exports, like China and India, claim that they should not bear the responsi-
50 bility for production from which they do not benefit in terms of consumption
51 (BBC, 2009). On the other hand, the USA and other developed economies,
52 fear that their economies' competitiveness will be impaired if they have to
53 cope with any binding target that is not also applied to developing economies.
54 Environmental regulations can draw away investors, promoting the reloca-
55 tion of industries to environmentally unregulated economies (the pollution
56 haven hypothesis) and enhancing any potential carbon leakage. These po-
57 sitions have not changed, as could be seen in the COP15 meeting, held in
58 Copenhagen in 2009. The Copenhagen Accord, which was supposed to be
59 the successor of the Kyoto Protocol, does not establish binding targets, al-
60 though it recognizes that a deep cut in emissions is necessary (UNFCCC,
61 2010).

62 An often suggested measure for reducing the effect of carbon leakage
63 on a country's competitiveness are carbon- motivated border tax adjust-
64 ments. This tool involves the participation of individual countries in a global
65 scheme of emissions reduction. Participating countries lay a charge on prod-
66 ucts imported from non-participating countries, the amount charged should
67 reflect the cost of carbon, in terms of emissions trading, as if the goods im-
68 ported were to be produced in the participating country (Ismer and Neuhoff,
69 2004; Whalley, 2009). This mechanism would allow participating countries
70 to be partially refunded from their carbon abatement costs, whereas non-

71 participating countries exporting to participating countries would face a
72 penalty (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2004) and thus have an incentive to join the
73 scheme. The effectiveness of carbon-tax adjustments as well as their com-
74 patibility with the World Trade Organization are issues still under debate
75 (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2004; de Cendra, 2006; Whalley, 2009).

76 **2. Consumption-based responsibility**

77 Consumption-based responsibility has been discussed by several authors,
78 as an alternative to responsibility based on direct emissions, to name a few:
79 Eder and Narodoslawsky (1999); Munksgaard and Pedersen (2001); Ahmad
80 and Wyckoff (2003); Bastianoni et al. (2004); Peters and Hertwich (2008a,b);
81 Davis and Caldeira (2010). This metric measures the emissions generated to
82 produce a country's final demand for goods and services. These equal the
83 emissions stemming from within the national territory minus the domestic
84 emissions required to generate exports plus foreign emissions required to
85 generate imports. For a certain product, this metric takes into account all
86 the emissions generated along its supply chain prior to the delivery to final
87 demand; for that reason these are often called *upstream embodied emissions*.

88 The adoption of this type of responsibility is supported by China. Around
89 20% of China's emissions are generated in the production of exports, therefore
90 China claims that a fair agreement should take into consideration that those
91 emissions take place to produce goods that are not consumed by the Chinese
92 people (BBC, 2009).

93 According to the principle of responsibility based on consumption, a coun-
94 try is responsible for the emissions generated by its final demand. This in-

95 cludes emissions embodied in imports but leaves out emissions embodied in
96 exports. In fact, consumer-based responsibility is a carbon trade balance
97 as was pointed out by Rodrigues et al. (2010); Serrano and Dietzenbacher
98 (2010) and Kanemoto et al. (2012).

99 Unlike production-based inventories, consumption-based responsibility ac-
100 counts for the emissions generated through international trade, and mini-
101 mizes the effects of carbon leakage by holding countries responsible for the
102 emissions embodied in their trade balance (Peters and Hertwich, 2008b; Pe-
103 ters, 2008; Bruckner et al., 2009; Marques et al., 2011).

104 A measure of responsibility based on consumption is a trade related mea-
105 sure, which in the context of climate policy can be seen as a carbon con-
106 sumption tax without being a real tax and therefore not interfering with
107 WTO regulations (Peters, 2008). On the other hand consumption-based
108 GHG inventories can be used to measure the carbon content of goods and
109 services and determine a tax on consumption, like Value Added Tax, that
110 would reflect the costs of a certain product in terms of carbon.

111 **3. Income-based responsibility**

112 Some authors have developed another metric of environmental pressure,
113 downstream responsibility (Rodrigues et al., 2006; Lenzen et al., 2007; Ro-
114 drrigues et al., 2010; Lenzen and Murray, 2010). This metric measures the
115 emissions required to generate a country's income through wages, profits and
116 rents. These equal the emissions generated within national boundaries minus
117 the domestic emissions generated downstream of imported products plus the
118 foreign emissions generated downstream of exported products. For a certain

119 product, this measure accounts for all the emissions generated downstream
120 in its supply chain until delivery to final demand; for that reason Lenzen and
121 Murray (2010) named these type of emissions *downstream enabled emissions*.

122 Downstream responsibility has never received the same discussion as its
123 consumption-based cognate, perhaps because there is not yet a clear notion
124 of what it means (Lenzen and Murray, 2010). A recent work by Lenzen
125 and Murray (2010) has provided a substantial clarification of the term, by
126 providing a match between the less known downstream-based vocabulary and
127 the well-known consumption-based vocabulary. There are applications of the
128 concept at the level of countries (Rodrigues et al., 2010; Lenzen and Murray,
129 2010; Marques et al., 2011), and at the corporate level (WBCSD and WRI,
130 2010; Lenzen and Murray, 2010).

131 The total emissions enabled by the primary supply of a country are equal
132 to the total of emissions enabled by the various classes of primary inputs:
133 households (mainly as receiver of wages as payments for labour), by the
134 government (mainly as a tax collector and provider of public goods) and
135 by capital owners (as receiver of profits). The income-based emissions of
136 a country include the emissions enabled by the supply to the international
137 market (exports) but does not include the emissions enabled by the demand
138 from the international market (imports) (Rodrigues et al., 2010; Marques
139 et al., 2011).

140 From a technical point of view, the accounting of income-based respon-
141 sibility has the same characteristics as consumption-based responsibility.
142 Therefore, income-based responsibility also accounts for emissions generated
143 through international activities and can be used to minimize the effects of

144 carbon leakage.

145 Whereas the use of consumption-based responsibility as a metric to levy
146 a carbon tax would be a tax on consumption, the equivalent use of income-
147 based responsibility would function as an income tax. For example, such
148 a tax would reduce more strongly the income earned by a shareholder of
149 a coal fired power plant than the income earned by an investor through
150 agricultural investments. The same logic applies to countries. The income
151 generated by a country whose main activity is oil extraction would have a
152 higher responsibility (and thus a higher tax rate) than the income of a country
153 whose main activity is fruit production.

154 A recent report by IDE-JETRO and WTO (2011) draws attention to the
155 drastic changes that occurred in the structure of international trade in the
156 last decades. Many products are no longer made in a single country, but
157 instead production chains have become fragmented, with different countries
158 specializing in specific stages of the supply chain, leading to a move from trade
159 in goods to a trade in tasks (Hummels et al., 2001; IDE-JETRO and WTO,
160 2011). This shift increases the trade volume of intermediate goods, which
161 are reexported several times during the processing stage, before reaching the
162 country of assembly into a final good, which can itself be exported.

163 The emergence of global production chains changed the paradigm of in-
164 ternational trade, from a situation in which the last step in a supply chain
165 accounted for most added value to a situation in which it only represents a
166 small fraction (IDE-JETRO and WTO, 2011). Under this current paradigm
167 new statistical metrics, complementary to the traditional ones, need to be
168 implemented in order to provide a clear view of the international trade. IDE-

169 JETRO and WTO (2011) proposes the use of international trade of value
 170 added. This measure enables the correct determination of the relative im-
 171 portance of each region that takes part in a global supply chain. This report
 172 and the new framework it presents open the door for wider applications of
 173 income-based responsibility.

174 4. Case study

175 In this Section we present the results of the quantification of income-
 176 based responsibility, for 112 world regions, using the Global Trade Analysis
 177 Project (GTAP) database. We compare the results with production and
 178 consumption-based responsibilities.

179 4.1. Data and methodology

180 We used the GTAP 7.1 database (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008) to
 181 build a Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) model, for the year 2004. The
 182 construction process of the model using GTAP data, as well as the method-
 183 ology to compute consumer-based responsibility are described thoroughly
 184 elsewhere (Rodrigues et al., submitted). To quantify income-based respon-
 185 sibility we followed the same approach. The computation of income-based
 186 intensity was performed iteratively, since it is the fastest computation method
 187 available (Rodrigues et al., submitted), according to the following expression:

$$\mathbf{m}_{i+1}^D = \mathbf{m}_L + \hat{\mathbf{x}}^{-1} \mathbf{Z} \mathbf{m}_i^D, \quad (1)$$

188 lowercase are vectors, uppercase are matrices, vectors are in column for-
 189 mat, $\hat{\cdot}$ is diagonal matrix, \mathbf{m}^L and \mathbf{m}^D are the vectors of direct and down-

190 stream carbon intensity (Rodrigues et al., 2010) and \mathbf{Z} and \mathbf{x} are, respectively,
 191 the matrix of inter-industry transactions and the vector of total output. The
 192 initial condition is $\mathbf{m}_0^D = \mathbf{m}^L$, and the converge criterion occurs when a
 193 desired fraction of downstream emissions embodied in primary income has
 194 fallen below a threshold of $1 \times 10^{-6}\%$.

195 *4.2. Per capita and per dollar GDP carbon responsibilities*

196 The detailed results obtained are reported in Table 1. In order to facilitate
 197 the subsequent discussion we selected 15 representative regions for which we
 198 present figures. These regions are either individual countries or two aggregate
 199 EU regions: EUR-17 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Greece,
 200 Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal,
 201 Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) and EUR-8 (Czech Republic, Estonia,
 202 Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). The latter is
 203 the group of countries that joined the European Union in 2004.

GTAP code	Region's name	Producer	Consumer	Income	Pop.	GDP
AUS	Australia	315.27	305.47	376.61	19.94	637.79
NZL	New Zealand	28.34	34.30	29.45	3.99	96.44
XOC	Rest of Oceania	17.22	17.75	15.56	8.71	21.28
CHN	China	4071.13	3147.11	3450.95	1307.99	1674.13
HKG	Hong Kong	54.70	97.23	92.20	6.96	163.01
JPN	Japan	924.98	1214.09	1058.83	127.92	4658.74
KOR	South Korea	344.35	335.40	316.03	47.64	676.50
TWN	Taiwan	220.70	167.41	199.11	22.76	305.29
XEA	Rest of East Asia	75.80	57.27	65.68	25.36	25.59
KHM	Cambodia	2.81	3.71	2.19	13.80	4.88
IDN	Indonesia	295.57	261.55	307.17	220.08	254.70
LAO	Lao PDR	1.40	2.00	1.11	5.79	2.45
MYS	Malaysia	125.32	68.91	145.18	24.89	114.90

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GTAP code	Region's name	Producer	Consumer	Income	Pop.	GDP
PHL	Philippines	67.38	72.68	52.22	81.62	84.48
SGP	Singapore	38.20	58.33	46.76	4.27	106.81
THA	Thainland	192.72	144.05	148.13	63.69	161.70
VNM	Vietname	72.93	67.97	55.31	83.12	43.03
XSE	Rest of Southeast Asia	7.44	9.08	18.02	51.30	5.59
BGD	Bangladesh	28.78	41.11	25.00	139.21	55.91
IND	India	919.76	860.79	760.23	1087.12	641.26
PAK	Pakistan	111.19	126.67	88.15	154.79	94.73
LKA	Sri Lanka	10.86	15.63	9.25	20.57	20.08
XSA	Rest of South Asia	8.35	13.97	7.77	56.32	13.90
CAN	Canada	460.01	424.99	512.81	31.96	979.13
USA	United States of America	4879.14	5511.71	4650.48	295.41	11673.38
MEX	Mexico	327.08	353.65	189.41	105.70	683.24
XNA	Rest of North America	3.15	4.95	1.49	0.13	5.89
ARG	Argentina	118.20	88.41	124.44	38.37	150.40
BOL	Bolivia	8.96	8.52	9.39	9.01	8.78
BRA	Brazil	234.81	215.53	241.66	183.91	616.54
CHL	Chile	54.98	44.07	52.67	16.12	89.64
COL	Colombia	45.19	48.14	62.14	44.92	97.46
ECU	Ecuador	17.31	21.09	26.82	13.04	29.97
PRY	Paraguay	2.87	4.55	4.79	6.02	8.42
PER	Peru	25.09	30.06	27.98	27.56	68.63
URY	Uruguay	4.02	6.30	3.39	3.44	13.69
VEN	Venezuela	123.52	88.30	179.07	26.28	108.23
XSM	Rest of South America	1.86	2.37	1.23	1.39	3.52
CRI	Costa Rica	4.14	6.39	5.11	4.25	19.47
GTM	Guatemala	8.47	13.49	6.47	12.29	27.45
NIC	Nicaragua	3.51	4.56	1.85	5.38	4.39
PAN	Panama	4.87	7.86	5.24	3.18	12.60
XCA	Rest of Central America	11.00	16.51	8.51	14.07	24.15
XCB	Caribbean	142.85	139.65	89.92	38.45	193.12
AUT	Austria	52.27	82.86	68.14	8.17	292.31
BEL	Belgium	72.39	124.15	85.20	10.42	352.31
CYP	Cyprus	7.05	9.24	5.45	0.83	15.42
CZE	Czech Republic	99.41	81.15	81.68	10.23	108.03
DNK	Denmark	44.27	62.00	65.20	5.41	243.73
EST	Estonia	15.03	13.55	10.68	1.34	10.22

Continued on next page

GTAP code	Region's name	Producer	Consumer	Income	Pop.	GDP
FIN	Finland	57.67	69.19	64.69	5.24	185.92
FRA	France	255.58	410.46	302.32	60.26	2046.47
DEU	Germany	599.25	804.45	733.92	82.65	2740.50
GRC	Greece	74.78	94.89	77.69	11.10	205.20
HUN	Hungary	42.71	52.20	37.33	10.12	99.65
IRL	Ireland	33.97	46.59	52.95	4.08	182.24
ITA	Italy	332.60	476.05	340.80	58.03	1677.82
LVA	Latvia	6.45	11.84	5.85	2.32	13.47
LTU	Lithuania	9.42	14.51	9.15	3.44	21.20
LUX	Luxembourg	9.73	11.25	9.83	0.45	31.86
MLT	Malta	2.73	3.43	1.56	0.40	5.32
NLD	Netherlands	165.81	172.01	155.14	16.23	578.98
POL	Poland	240.70	212.64	202.00	38.56	233.62
PRT	Portugal	50.19	64.34	45.92	10.44	167.72
SVK	Slovakia	24.67	25.91	20.51	5.40	41.55
SVN	Slovenia	12.62	13.93	12.97	1.97	32.52
ESP	Spain	266.76	324.69	258.40	42.65	1039.90
SWE	Sweden	37.41	69.97	64.65	9.01	346.41
GBR	United Kingdom	438.29	657.35	541.88	59.48	2123.60
CHE	Switzerland	26.69	72.40	59.52	7.24	357.54
NOR	Norway	52.45	46.51	143.27	4.60	250.05
XEF	Rest of EFTA	4.62	5.64	4.68	0.32	15.71
ALB	Albania	4.24	5.77	3.82	3.11	8.99
BGR	Bulgaria	41.83	31.29	32.12	7.78	24.57
BLR	Belarus	50.59	43.54	48.50	9.81	21.96
HRV	Croatia	15.20	20.30	11.58	4.54	33.93
ROU	Romania	76.53	69.01	58.11	21.79	74.42
RUS	Russian Federation	1332.95	1016.77	1464.48	143.90	569.84
UKR	Ukraine	217.62	126.61	159.47	46.99	60.98
XEE	Rest of Eastern Europe	5.89	8.15	3.05	4.22	2.60
XER	Rest of Europe	70.96	68.06	56.35	14.29	44.98
KAZ	Kazakhstan	161.61	134.85	157.05	14.84	44.35
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	5.18	5.71	4.66	5.20	2.21
XSU	Rest of former Soviet Union	132.88	94.27	128.90	37.40	20.20
ARM	Armenia	3.38	4.29	2.47	3.03	3.34
AZE	Azerbaijan	24.18	26.86	21.59	8.35	8.73
GEO	Georgia	2.43	4.67	2.36	4.52	4.47

Continued on next page

GTAP code	Region's name	Producer	Consumer	Income	Pop.	GDP
IRN	Iran	299.80	301.86	340.16	68.80	157.86
TUR	Turkey	163.34	192.71	153.30	72.22	295.83
XWS	Rest of West Asia	909.16	707.86	1235.51	118.40	691.10
EGY	Egypt	120.29	101.71	113.73	72.64	76.81
MAR	Morocco	31.86	38.01	27.92	31.02	50.25
TUN	Tunisia	18.38	18.61	14.76	10.00	27.99
XNF	Rest of Norh Africa	127.64	110.65	191.62	38.10	112.39
NGA	Nigeria	39.92	38.16	101.83	128.71	68.57
SEN	Senegal	4.15	5.91	2.24	11.39	7.20
XWF	Rest of West Africa	19.85	34.51	20.36	117.42	50.73
XCF	Rest of Central Africa	7.80	11.54	27.42	35.36	38.01
XAC	Rest of South C. Africa	9.09	14.40	37.72	71.34	23.89
ETH	Ethiopia	3.70	6.74	2.34	75.60	7.28
MDG	Madagascar	1.36	2.03	1.84	18.11	4.35
MWI	Malawi	0.55	1.57	0.63	12.61	1.79
MUS	Mauritius	1.83	3.80	2.43	1.23	5.92
MOZ	Mozambique	1.60	3.40	2.04	19.42	6.09
TZA	Tanzania	3.06	6.51	2.99	37.63	11.47
UGA	Uganda	2.26	3.51	2.90	27.82	7.27
ZMB	Zambia	1.77	3.09	2.14	11.48	5.40
ZWE	Zimbabwe	8.78	6.89	7.81	12.94	4.08
XEC	Rest of Eastern Africa	21.04	34.27	25.33	99.73	50.19
BWA	Botswana	3.76	6.38	4.53	1.77	8.72
ZAF	South Africa	329.12	213.38	312.64	47.21	213.93
XSC	Rest of SACU	3.44	6.33	4.86	4.84	9.06
		21731	21731	21731	6405	40962

Table 1: Producer, consumer and income-based responsibility of GTAP regions (year 2004) (Mt CO₂).

204

205 Figure 1 displays the per capita producer, consumer and income-based
206 responsibilities of the selected regions. The per capita normalization allows
207 a better comparison between countries than the corresponding absolute val-
208 ues. Per capita producer responsibility tells us how many tons of CO₂ are

209 generated inside the country's border per inhabitant. Per capita consumer
 210 responsibility indicates the emissions that each person is responsible for as
 211 a consumer of final goods and services. Finally, income responsibility repre-
 212 sents the emissions enabled by each person as a supplier of primary inputs.




Figure 1: Per capita producer, consumer and income-based responsibilities (in ton CO₂).

213 We see that citizens of wealthier economies are, on average, responsible
 214 for more CO₂ emissions than citizens from least developed economies. We
 215 also see that in wealthier regions per capita consumer responsibility is typ-
 216 ically higher than producer responsibility. This observation indicates that,
 217 in these regions, the (upstream) carbon embodied in imports exceed the car-
 218 bon embodied in exports. This phenomenon is particularly striking in small

219 open economies, such as Singapore (SGP) or Switzerland (CHE), who rely
220 strongly on international trade. On the other hand, for bigger economies,
221 like USA or China (CHN), the indirect measures of responsibility are closer
222 to the direct measure due to the predominance of the domestic effects.

223 However, some rich economies such as Canada (CAN), Australia (AUS)
224 and Norway (NOR) are exceptions to this norm. These countries have per
225 capita consumer responsibilities lower than producer responsibilities but in-
226 terestingly, all exhibit an income-based responsibility that is higher than pro-
227 ducer responsibility. This same pattern can be observed in other countries,
228 for example Russia (RUS), Venezuela (VEN) or Iran (IRN). This indicates
229 that the supply of primary inputs provided by these regions enabled the
230 generation of emissions abroad.

231 A similarity between all countries mentioned in the previous paragraph
232 is the fact that they are all fossil fuel exporters. Therefore, the interpreta-
233 tion of these results is straightforward. It is the export of fossil fuels that
234 enables the occurrence of emissions abroad when the fuel is burned and the
235 emissions take place. The rationale for income-based responsibility can be
236 put as follows: a country who supplies fossil fuels should hold responsibility
237 for the emissions generated downstream, because it receives money from the
238 fuel sale. Interestingly, using this indicator we find that Norway, a country
239 with mostly hydro-generated electricity and a very ‘clean’ economy (Peters
240 and Hertwich, 2006; Yamakawa and Peters, 2011), has the highest per-capita
241 income-based responsibility in the world.

242 In Figure 2 producer, consumer and income-based carbon intensities of
243 GDP are plotted. We find that developing economies have higher carbon




Figure 2: Per 2004 dollar GDP producer, consumer and income-based responsibilities (in ton CO₂).

244 intensities than more developed economies. The relations between producer,
 245 consumer and income responsibilities are maintained, in case of rich countries
 246 the differences are smoothed (for example, NOR), in case of not so wealthier
 247 countries differences are sharpened (for example, VEN). Brazil (BRA) ap-
 248 pears amongst more developed economies, a exception to the pattern fins.
 249 This may be explained by the fact that this country highly relies on hydro
 250 power. In 2004, the % of domestic electricity generated from hydro power
 251 was 82.8, only surpassed by Norway (NOR) with 98.8 (IEA, 2006).

252 5. Conclusions

253 The aim of this work is to clarify and illustrate the potential applications
254 of the concept of downstream responsibility. We believe that the modest
255 size of the literature and research on this topic results from the difficulty in
256 providing a clear intuition for this metric, which in turn makes the under-
257 standing by the general public difficult.

258 However, we believe that this lack of intuitiveness might be a problem of
259 nomenclature. Will the general public recognize the term 'upstream responsi-
260 bility' as meaning 'consumption-based responsibility'? The term upstream,
261 *per se*, indicates the direction from where carbon responsibility arrives to
262 an agent, but it says nothing about the economic process that caused the
263 emissions. Thus this term was replaced in the literature by a more intu-
264 itive one: consumer-based responsibility. Downstream responsibility also tell
265 from where carbon responsibility arrives to an agent, but it also says noth-
266 ing about the economic process that caused the emissions. In this case the
267 process in question is the supply of primary inputs, to production processes,
268 that enable emissions to occur (Table 2). Therefore downstream responsi-
269 bility could be replaced by supply-based responsibility. However if we agree
270 that responsibility should be placed on those that take some benefit from
271 carbon emissions, supply-based responsibility is not informative regarding
272 that benefit, whereas consumption-based responsibility is. The supply of
273 primary inputs, to a production process involves the provision of labour (or
274 any other primary factor of production) in return of a salary, or in a broader
275 view an income. Therefore we propose the term income-based responsibility
276 to address downstream responsibility.

Responsibility	Production-based	Consumption-based	Income-based
Process	Production	Demand	Supply
Emissions	Direct	Embodied	Enabled
Direction	-	Upstream	Downstream

Table 2: Comparison between different types of approaches to GHG emissions responsibility.

277 To provide some illustrations of this metric we have presented empirical
278 values of income-based responsibility and compared them to the Kyoto defini-
279 tion of producer responsibility and the frequently used measure of consumer-
280 based responsibility. We find that, for some countries, each responsibility
281 metric provides very different values, while for other countries, they are very
282 similar.

283 The most emblematic case is that of Norway. This is a rich nation, seen as
284 one of the 'cleanest' countries in the world, with low producer and consumer
285 responsibilities. However, when is analyzed from the point of view of the
286 emissions enabled by its income we find that Norway is a country whose
287 income is generated at the expense of large CO₂ emissions due to the export
288 of fossil fuels.

289 If a consumer-based indicator is used, a costumer can improve his/her
290 environmental performance through the selection of clean suppliers. An
291 income-based indicator offers the symmetric possibility to suppliers. For
292 example, Norway can increase its environmental performance by deciding to
293 sell fossil fuels only to countries with carbon efficient production chains.

294 Another application for income-based responsibility could be its use, to-

295 gether with consumption-based responsibility in a single metric of shared
296 responsibility, as proposed by some authors (Rodrigues et al., 2006; Lenzen
297 et al., 2007).

298 We hope that this paper has helped to clarify the interpretation and
299 application scope of income-based responsibility.

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