

Exposure to Digital Automation and Jobs in Global Value Chains

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Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Methods and descriptives
- 3 Main results
- 4 Conclusions

Motivation

- **GVC reconfiguration:** The “polycrisis” (COVID-19, geopolitical tensions, climate shocks) has exposed fragilities of hyper-globalised production (Gereffi, 2020), triggering reshoring, nearshoring and friend-shoring (Baldwin, 2022)
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- **Digital automation shock:** Simultaneously, a wave of heterogeneous digital technologies (AI, IoT, 3D printing, e-commerce, smart mobility ...) is reshaping how goods and services are produced *and traded*
 - ⇒ ICT reduces coordination costs ⇒ may *lengthen* GVCs
 - ⇒ Automation may substitute routine labour ⇒ may *shorten* GVCs via reshoring
 - ⇒ Uneven diffusion ⇒ heterogeneous impacts across sectors and countries

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Central question: How does exposure to different digital automation technologies reshape employment through GVC channels? Does digitisation help or hurt workers in globally integrated economies?

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- Skill complementarity may increase co-location (Juhász et al., 2024)
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- **Gap:** Decomposes the GVC digital-employment nexus across technologies

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We decompose the digital automation–employment relationship in GVCs to study how *different* technologies influence *different* employment drivers

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 - ① *Productivity*: Δ labour required per unit of output
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- We project these drivers onto exposure to **40 digital automation technologies** grouped in 9 families (Prytkova et al., 2025)

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- Manufacturing: digital exposure $\Rightarrow$ labour-saving (productivity channel)
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- **OECD Inter-Country Input–Output Tables (ICIO) and Trade in Employment (TiM) 2024 release:**
 - Employment, value added, GVC jobs, final demand flows
 - Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in computing equipment (C26) – proxy for digital adoption capacity
 - Complement with ILO modelled estimates to maximise country coverage
- **TechXposure database** (Prytkova et al., 2025): Industries' exposure to 40 technologies grouped in 9 families. Based on patent text similarity to NACE industry descriptions (sentence transformers; 2012–19)
- **Coverage:** 74 countries $\times$ 45 industries; focus on 30 manufacturing and professional service industries for regressions

$$\text{Total Employment} = E' VBF'$$

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- E' = diagonalised vector: employment per unit of value added (inverse labour productivity)
- V = diagonal matrix of VA per unit of output
- $B = (I - A)^{-1}$ = Leontief inverse (inter-country/inter-industry linkages)
- F' = diagonalised vector of final demand

⇒ Final demand (F') activates gross output through linkages (B); that output requires value added (V); producing value added uses labour at intensity E'

GVC jobs matrix

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GVC jobs isolate employment activated by *foreign* final demand:

$$\text{GVC jobs} = E' V \hat{B} F'$$


where $\hat{B}$ sets all within-country blocks of B to zero – keeping only cross-border demand propagation (Pahl et al., 2022)

From total jobs to GVC jobs Toy example

$$E'VB\hat{B}F' = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & e_a v b_{ab} f_b & e_a v b_{ac} f_c \\ e_b v b_{ba} f_a & 0 & e_b v b_{bc} f_c \\ e_c v b_{ca} f_a & e_c v b_{cb} f_b & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$


- **Rows:** where the jobs are located (country supplying labour)
- **Columns:** whose final demand is pulling jobs
- **Off-diagonals:** foreign-demand generated jobs = GVC jobs
- GVC jobs are large in small, open economies (Belgium, Ireland, Estonia, Vietnam, Malaysia...)
- In large economies (US, China), domestic demand dominates (GVC jobs still a significant share)

Employment and GVC jobs: country composition



Countries sorted by GVC employment share in 2012. Small open economies dominate at the left; large economies (US, China, India) at the right.


Employment and GVC jobs: growth (2012–19)



Countries sorted by GVC employment growth. GVC jobs track total employment but with more variance, especially in emerging economies.

Structural change: services GVC jobs growing fastest

Especially ICT (J62–63), Transport (H), Administrative (N) & Professional services (M)



Decomposition framework

We perform an average of two polar decompositions approach (Dietzenbacher and Los, 1998; Miller and Blair, 2022) of $\Delta E' VBF'$:

- 1 **Productivity** ($\Delta E'$): labour per unit of value added
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- 3 **Final demand** ($\Delta F'$): scale of global consumption

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$$\Delta E' VBF' = E' VBF'_{t_1} - E' VBF'_{t_0} = \Delta E' + \Delta(VB) + \Delta F' \quad (1)$$

$$= \underbrace{\frac{(E'_{t_1} - E'_{t_0}) VB_{t_0} F'_{t_0} + (E'_{t_1} - E'_{t_0}) VB_{t_1} F'_{t_1}}{2}}_{\text{Productivity}} \quad (2)$$





$$+ \underbrace{\frac{E'_{t_0} (VB_{t_1} - VB_{t_0}) F'_{t_1} + E'_{t_1} (VB_{t_1} - VB_{t_0}) F'_{t_0}}{2}}_{\text{GVC linkages}} \quad (3)$$

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The same decomposition applies to $\Delta E' V\hat{B}F'$ (GVC jobs) replacing B with $\hat{B}$

Employment decomposition by income group (2000–2019)

Employment percentage change and components by World Bank Income Group




Change components normalised by total employment in 2012

Final demand and productivity are the dominant drivers and typically offset each other. GVC linkages contribute more in HICs and UMICs (services) small countries.


Employment decomposition by industry (2000–2019)

Structural change towards service sectors; GVC linkages significant in ICT, transport and business services



GVC jobs decomposition by industry (2012–2019)

- GVC linkages are a *larger* contributor to GVC jobs
- GVC linkages drive employment gains in transport (H), internet services (J62–63), business services (N, M)
- Productivity offsets are larger for GVC-integrated manufacturing (C26, C27)
- Final D always (except BLR) positive



Change in GVC jobs components have been normalised by total employment in 2012

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
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Combined **adoption potential** measure for country i , industry j , technology family *tech*:

$$\text{Digit}_{ij}^{tech} = \text{TechXposure}_j^{tech} \times \overline{cpte}_{i, 07-11} \quad (5)$$

- $\text{TechXposure}_j^{tech}$: exposure of industry j to technology family *tech*
- $\overline{cpte}_{i, 07-11}$: country i pre-sample average C26 investment per worker
- Bartik instrument logic: global technology frontier (shift) $\times$ local adoption capacity (share)

Technological exposure across industries



Exposure to four selected technology families by industry. Manufacturing sectors (C-codes) dominate 3D Printing and Embedded Systems; service sectors (J, M, N) dominate Digital Services and Computer Vision.

Econometric approach

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$$\Delta E_{ij} = \alpha + \sum_{tech} \beta_{tech} \text{Digit}_{ij}^{tech} + \kappa_i + \delta_j + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (6)$$

- **8 outcome variables** ΔE_{ij} : [Total / GVC jobs] $\times$ [Aggregate / Final demand driver / GVC linkage driver / Productivity driver]
- κ_i : country fixed effects (absorb macro shocks, exchange rates)
- δ_j : industry fixed effects (absorb global sectoral trends)
- Period: 2012–2019; all nine technology families included jointly
- Restrict to manufacturing and professional service industries (30 sectors)
- Standard errors clustered at country-industry level

Outlier winsorisation at $1.5 \times \text{IQR}$, conditional on industry-country having >10 th percentile employment share in 2012

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Baseline results: all sectors

When manufacturing and services are pooled, no statistically significant net employment effect. [Plots](#)

But this masks structural compensation:

- **3D Printing:** productivity saves labour (-0.0016pp), offset by final demand ($+0.01\text{pp}$)

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- **Food Services platforms:** positive GVC linkage ($+0.01pp$): digital platforms deepen supply chain integration

Manufacturing vs. services

The same technology can have opposite signs across sectors

Manufacturing

Plots

- Digital tech is mainly **labour-saving via productivity (total employment)**
- E-Commerce: -0.02pp productivity
- Computer Vision: -0.09pp productivity (partially offset by $+0.06\text{pp}$ GVC linkages)
- Digital Services: offsetting effects ($+0.10\text{pp}$ productivity, -0.07pp GVC linkages, -0.03pp demand) $\Rightarrow$ net null
- Food Services: $+0.03\text{pp}$ total employment via GVC linkages

Services

Plots

- Digital tech mainly **reshapes GVC organisation and expands markets**
- Smart Mobility: $+0.14\text{pp}$ GVC employment (GVC linkages $+0.11\text{pp}$, final demand $+0.01\text{pp}$)
- 3D Printing: $+0.11\text{pp}$ GVC employment (GVC linkages $+0.13\text{pp}$)
- E-Commerce: $+0.05\text{pp}$ GVC employment via linkages
- Computer Vision: $+0.26\text{pp}$ GVC employment
- Embedded Systems: -0.10pp GVC employment via linkages

Manufacturing vs. services divide

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 - Smart mobility (logistics, transport coordination): reduces spatial friction
 - E-commerce: reallocates service GVC employment toward internationally linked activities
 - Computer vision (AI applications): expands internationally fragmented service activities
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- **Implication:** digital automation reorganises *which* services are traded and *where* they are produced, reconfiguring GVC workers tasks

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 - 4 **GVC linkages matter mainly in services:** Digitalisation affects GVC jobs in services mainly through reorganisation of international supply.

Policy implications

- **Consider heterogeneity:** Job creation/destruction over GVCs are driver-, technology-, and sector-specific.
- **Manufacturing policy:** Productivity-enhancing digital adoption frees resources but risks employment losses unless accompanied by **increased demand** or **functional upgrading** within GVCs.
- **Services and trade policy:** Facilitating digital services trade (interoperability, data governance, regulations) may have employment benefits.
- **Caution on “turning inward”:** reshoring risks forgoing the GVC-activated employment gains from digital technologies in services sectors.
- **Re-skilling:** The reorganisation of service GVCs by digital technologies creates new tasks that require workers with complementary skills.

Thank you for your attention

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Comments and questions very welcome

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Outline

5 Appendix

Toy example

Assumptions

- **Two countries:** A and B (one industry each).
- **Technical coefficients** (inputs per unit output in the *column* country):

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 0.40 & 0.10 \\ 0.20 & 0.30 \end{bmatrix}$$

- **Employment per unit VA:** $e_A = 8$, $e_B = 4 \Rightarrow E' = \text{diag}(8, 4)$
- **Final demand (by destination, \$):** $F' = \begin{bmatrix} 100 \\ 100 \end{bmatrix}$
- **Value-added shares:** (1 - inputs)
 $v_A = 1 - (0.40 + 0.20) = 0.40$, $v_B = 1 - (0.10 + 0.30) = 0.60$
 $\Rightarrow V = \text{diag}(0.40, 0.60)$

Linkages and total jobs

Leontief inverse:

$$B = (I - A)^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1.75 & 0.25 \\ 0.50 & 1.50 \end{bmatrix}$$

Off-diagonals capture cross-border links: $b_{AB} = 0.25$, $b_{BA} = 0.50$.

Total employment pulled by final demand:

$$\text{Jobs}_{\text{total}} = E' V B F'$$

$$E' V B = \begin{bmatrix} 5.6 & 0.8 \\ 1.2 & 3.6 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 5.6 \cdot 100 + 0.8 \cdot 100 \\ 1.2 \cdot 100 + 3.6 \cdot 100 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \text{Jobs}_{\text{total}} = \begin{bmatrix} 640 \\ 480 \end{bmatrix}$$

Interpretation: each column is “jobs per \$1 of final demand” in that destination; each row is where the jobs are located: 640 jobs located in A; 480 jobs located in B.

Jobs matrix (rows = where jobs are located; cols = whose demand):

$$J = E'VB \operatorname{diag}(F') = \begin{bmatrix} 560 & 80 \\ 120 & 360 \end{bmatrix}$$

- Diagonals (560, 360): domestic-demand generated jobs.
- Off-diagonals (80, 120): foreign-demand generated jobs (the GVC jobs).

GVC jobs removing domestic links:

$$\hat{B} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0.25 \\ 0.50 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \text{GVC jobs} = E'V\hat{B}F' = \begin{bmatrix} 80 \\ 120 \end{bmatrix}$$

Shares: $A = 80/640 = 12.5\%$; $B = 120/480 = 25\%$.

9 Technology Families: 40 Emerging Technologies

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Family	Emerging Digital Technology
F1 3D Printing	01 3D Printer Hardware
	02 3D Printing
	03 Additive Manufacturing

Family	Emerging Digital Technology

Source: Prytkova et al. (2025)

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F2	Embedded Systems	04	Smart Agriculture & Water Management
		05	Internet of Things (IoT)
		06	Predictive Energy Management and Distribution
		07	Industrial Automation & Robot Control
		08	Remote Monitoring & Control Systems
		09	Smart Home & Intelligent Household Control

Source: Prytkova et al. (2025)

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F3	Smart Mobility	10	Intelligent Logistics
		11	Autonomous Vehicles & UAVs
		12	Parking and Vehicle Space Management
		13	Vehicle Telematics & Electric Vehicle Management
		14	Passenger Transportation

Source: Prytkova et al. (2025)

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[illegible]

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Family	Emerging Digital Technology
F5 E-Commerce	16 Digital Advertising 17 Electronic Trading and Auctions 18 Online Shopping Platforms 19 E-Coupons & Promotion Management

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Source: Prytkova et al. (2025)

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Family	Emerging Digital Technology	
F6 Payment Systems	20	Electronic Payments & Financial Transactions
	21	Mobile Payments
	22	Gaming & Wagering Systems

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Family	Emerging Digital Technology
F7 Digital Services	23 Digital Authentication 24 E-Learning 25 Location-Based Services & Tracking 26 Voice Communication 27 Electronic Messaging 28 Workflow Management 29 Cloud Storage & Data Security 30 Information Processing 31 Cloud Computing 32 Recommender Systems 33 Social Networking & Media Platforms 34 Digital Media Content

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Family	Emerging Digital Technology
F8 Computer Vision	35 Augmented and Virtual Reality (AR/VR) 36 Machine Learning & Neural Networks 37 Medical Imaging & Image Processing

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
9 Technology Families: 40 Emerging Technologies [Back](#)

Family	Emerging Digital Technology
F1 3D Printing	01 3D Printer Hardware
	02 3D Printing
	03 Additive Manufacturing
F2 Embedded Systems	04 Smart Agriculture & Water Management
	05 Internet of Things (IoT)
	06 Predictive Energy Management and Distribution
	07 Industrial Automation & Robot Control
	08 Remote Monitoring & Control Systems
	09 Smart Home & Intelligent Household Control
F3 Smart Mobility	10 Intelligent Logistics
	11 Autonomous Vehicles & UAVs
	12 Parking and Vehicle Space Management
	13 Vehicle Telematics & Electric Vehicle Management
	14 Passenger Transportation
F4 Food Services	15 Food Ordering & Vending Systems
F5 E-Commerce	16 Digital Advertising
	17 Electronic Trading and Auctions
	18 Online Shopping Platforms
	19 E-Coupons & Promotion Management


Family	Emerging Digital Technology
F6 Payment Systems	20 Electronic Payments & Financial Transactions
	21 Mobile Payments
	22 Gaming & Wagering Systems
F7 Digital Services	23 Digital Authentication
	24 E-Learning
	25 Location-Based Services & Tracking
	26 Voice Communication
	27 Electronic Messaging
	28 Workflow Management
	29 Cloud Storage & Data Security
	30 Information Processing
	31 Cloud Computing
	32 Recommender Systems
	33 Social Networking & Media Platforms
	34 Digital Media Content
F8 Computer Vision	35 Augmented and Virtual Reality (AR/VR)
	36 Machine Learning & Neural Networks
	37 Medical Imaging & Image Processing
F9 HealthTech	38 Health Monitoring
	39 Medical Information
	40 E-Healthcare

Source: Prytkova et al. (2025)

Baseline results: coefficient plots (all sectors)

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
(a) Total employment




(b) GVC employment

OLS coefficients for nine technology families across four outcomes (aggregate, final demand, GVC linkages, productivity). 95% CI on robust standard errors.

Manufacturing results: coefficient plots

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
(a) Total employment – Manufacturing




(b) GVC employment – Manufacturing

In manufacturing, statistically significant relations are predominantly through the productivity driver. Labour savings are more pronounced for GVC jobs than for total employment.

Services results: coefficient plots

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(a) Total employment – Services



(b) GVC employment – Services

In services, effects on total employment are muted and mainly through the GVC demand driver. GVC employment shows stronger and more systematic responses operating via GVC linkages and final demand.

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